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The increasing international mobility of high-skill individuals is often seen as
posing a threat to domestic social welfare, by limiting the ability of governments
to tax these individuals and redistribute to the poor. In this paper, we examine
a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model without commitment. In this set-
ting, it is shown that the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals facilitates
redistribution and increases social welfare in the short-run, and has no e¤ect on
social welfare over the long-run.
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JEL Classi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Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD,
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1 Introduction
Optimal tax analyses typically assume that individuals cannot emigrate to avoid domes-
tic taxation. Such an assumption is, however, increasingly viewed as being unrealistic,
especially as it relates to high-skill individuals. When high-skill individuals are immobile,
redistributive taxation must take into consideration that these individuals may change
their labour supply along the intensive margin. That is, high-skill individuals may work
less, thus reducing the amount of income available for redistribution. When high-skill
individuals are internationally mobile, they have the additional option of changing their
labour supply along the extensive margin, i.e., they may emigrate. An often-employed
method to capture the threat of emigration is to introduce type-dependent participation
constraints into the optimal tax problem; see, e.g., Osmundsen (1999), Krause (2009a),
Simula and Trannoy (2010, 2012), and Lehmann et al. (2014). Naturally, these addi-
tional constraints reduce the level of social welfare attainable.
In this paper, we introduce the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals into
a two-period nonlinear income tax model without commitment. As in the related lit-
erature, this threat is captured by introducing a participation constraint for high-skill
individuals. However, we show that the introduction of the high-skill types participation
constraint facilitates redistribution and increases social welfare in the short-run, and has
no e¤ect on social welfare over the long-run. One may wonder how it is possible that
the introduction of a binding constraint into an optimisation problem does not reduce
the maximised value of the objective function. The participation constraint appears in
period 2 and it does reduce the maximised value of the objective function (social wel-
fare) in that period, but the specic manner in which social welfare is reduced  by
limiting redistribution  enables a higher level of social welfare to be obtained in period
1. Thus social welfare summed over both periods remains unchanged. The intuition can
be summarised as follows. In period 1 the government does not know each individuals
skill type, and therefore implements standard (incentive-compatible) nonlinear income
taxation which induces individuals to reveal their type. However, high-skill individuals
know that if they reveal their type in period 1, they lose their information advantage and
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will be subjected to rst-best taxation in period 2. This means that high-skill individuals
must be o¤ered a very attractive tax treatment in period 1 to reveal their type, to com-
pensate them for having to face rst-best taxation in period 2. Accordingly, the ability
of the government to redistribute in period 1 is severely limited. However, the threat of
emigration reduces the extent of redistribution possible in period 2, meaning that high-
skill individuals require less compensation in period 1 to reveal their type. This enables
the government to implement more redistribution in period 1, which correspondingly
increases rst-period social welfare. The threat of emigration limits redistribution and
reduces social welfare in period 2, but optimal taxation balances the short-run benets
against the long-run costs. Thus the threat of emigration has no e¤ect on the level of
social welfare summed over both periods.
In terms of previous results, the paper most closely related to ours is that by Leite-
Monteiro (1997). He also nds that increased international mobility may enhance re-
distribution, but his model is entirely di¤erent to ours. In Leite-Monterios model, the
government can always implement rst-best personalised lump-sum taxes, and changes
in the countrys skill composition after migration takes place is what makes enhanced
redistribution a possibility. By contrast, in our model the participation constraint en-
sures that no one migrates, so the skill composition remains unchanged. Our paper
is also related to the literature on dynamic Mirrlees (1971) nonlinear income taxation
without commitment, e.g., Roberts (1984), Apps and Rees (2006), Brett and Weymark
(2008a), Krause (2009b), Berliant and Ledyard (2014), and Guo and Krause (2011, 2013,
2014, 2015a, 2015b). In dynamic Mirrlees models, the question arises as to whether the
government can or cannot commit to not using skill-type information revealed by in-
dividuals in earlier periods when it implements taxation in latter periods. A common
theme in the literature is the highlighting of how di¤erent and counter-intuitive optimal
policy can be when the commitment assumption is relaxed. The present paper provides
another example of a result that, at rst glance, appears quite counter-intuitive.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and the structure of optimal taxation, while Section 3 presents and discusses our result.
Section 4 discusses other possible solutions to the optimal tax problem, and what these
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would imply for our result. Section 5 concludes, and the proof of our result is contained
in an appendix.
2 A Simple Model
We consider a two-period model with a unit measure of individuals and with the following
timing. In period 1 the government knows that there are  2 (0; 1) high-skill individuals
and (1   ) low-skill individuals in the economy, but it does not know any individ-
uals skill type. The government therefore implements standard second-best (incentive-
compatible) nonlinear income taxation, under which each individual is willing to reveal
their type. Then, in period 2, the government knows each individuals skill type, and
is tempted to use this information to implement rst-best redistributive taxation. How-
ever, high-skill individuals have the option of emigrating, so redistribution is limited by
the high-skill types participation constraint. We assume that emigration is only possible
in period 2. The implications of this assumption are discussed in Section 4, though it
is consistent with the observation that individuals tend to be immobile in the short-run
(period 1), but mobile in the long-run (period 2). For simplicity we assume that indi-
viduals do not save or borrow, so the only link between the periods is the revelation and
use of skill-type information.












































i is type i s
pre-tax income in period t, with wi denoting type i s wage rate and l
t
i denoting type
i s labour supply in period t. It is assumed that wH > wL > 0 and that wages remain
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constant over time. Equation (2.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function, where u()
is increasing and strictly concave and the individuals utility function is quasi-linear in
labour.1 Equation (2.2) is the governments budget constraint,2 and equation (2.3) is the
high-skill types participation constraint. High-skill individuals can obtain a utility level
of VH by emigrating, which is their reservation utility. We assume that VH is su¢ciently
high such that equation (2.3) is binding, i.e., the threat of emigration is e¤ective. The
solution to programme (2:1)  (2:3) yields the value function W 2(;wL; wH ; VH), which
is the level of social welfare attainable in period 2.
In period 1 the government does not know each individuals skill type, and therefore
implements second-best (incentive-compatible) nonlinear income taxation. It chooses




















































is the utility that a high-skill individual would obtain in period
2 from the low-skill types tax treatment. That is, c2L = c
2
L(;wL; wH ; VH) and y
2
L =
y2L(;wL; wH ; VH) come from the solution to programme (2:1)  (2:3). We use  2 (0; 1)
to denote the discount factor.
Equation (2.4) is the rst-period utilitarian social welfare function. The government







Hi cannot a¤ect the level of social welfare attainable in period 2,
1The literature on the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes (e.g., Weymark (1987),
Brett and Weymark (2008b, 2011), and Simula (2010)) has shown that results are generally obtainable
only when the utility function is quasi-linear. As we make use of comparative statics methods, we also
assume that the utility function is quasi-linear.
2We assume that the government cannot save or borrow, and that its revenue requirement is zero.
Thus taxation is implemented only for redistributive purposes.
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which isW 2(;wL; wH ; VH). Therefore, the government in period 1 acts as if maximising
only rst-period social welfare. Equation (2.5) is the governments rst-period budget
constraint, while equation (2.6) is the high-skill types incentive-compatibility constraint.
In order for a high-skill individual to be willing to choose hc1H ; y
1
Hi in period 1 and
thus reveal their type, the utility they obtain from this choice in period 1 plus the utility
they obtain in period 2 (which will be their reservation utility, VH), must be greater than
or equal to the utility they could obtain by mimicking. A high-skill individual has two
mimicking strategies. First, a high-skill individual could choose the low-skill types tax
treatment in period 1  e¤ectively announcing to the government that they are low-skill
 and then not emigrate in period 2. In this case, because in period 1 they announced
that they are low-skill, the government in period 2 will treat them as low-skill and
give them the low-skill types tax treatment. The mimicking high-skill individual would
therefore obtain utility level bU2H in period 2. Second, a high-skill individual could choose
the low-skill types tax treatment in period 1 and then emigrate in period 2, to avoid
being treated as low-skill in period 2. In this case, they obtain utility level VH in period
2. Which of these mimicking strategies is best depends upon bU2H and VH . The rst is
better when bU2H > VH , and the second is better when bU2H < VH . Note that if bU2H  VH ,









the same as the condition required for incentive compatibility in static models. However,
as we explain below (in Subsection 3.1), bU2H > VH will hold unless VH is so high as to
undo a key feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation without commitment.
We make the standard assumption that any individual who is indi¤erent between
truthfully revealing their type and mimicking will tell the truth. Therefore, no mimicking
occurs in the solution to the optimal tax problem. We also omit the low-skill types
incentive-compatibility constraint, because we make the common assumption that the
redistributive goals of the government create an incentive for high-skill individuals to
mimic low-skill individuals, but not vice versa.3 As discussed earlier, emigration is only
3In fact, high-skill individuals generally have a stronger incentive to mimic when the government
cannot commit than when it can commit. This makes it theoretically possible that pooling taxation
may be optimal; see, e.g., Brett and Weymark (2008a), Krause (2009b), and Guo and Krause (2015a,
2015b). In this paper, however, we focus only on separating taxation, under which high-skill and low-
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possible in period 2, so a participation constraint does not appear in period 1. The
solution to programme (2:4)  (2:6) yields the value function W 1(;wL; wH ; bU2H ; VH ; ),
which represents the level of social welfare attainable in the rst period.
3 The Threat of Emigration and Social Welfare
It is shown in the appendix that:
Proposition Suppose bU2H > VH . In our dynamic nonlinear income tax model with-
out commitment, the threat of high-skill emigration increases social welfare in period 1
(@W 1()=@VH > 0), decreases social welfare in period 2 (@W
2()=@VH < 0), and has no
e¤ect on social welfare summed over the two periods (@W 1()=@VH+@W
2()=@VH = 0).
The proposition implies that the threat of high-skill emigration facilitates redistribu-
tion and increases social welfare in the short-run, and has no e¤ect on the level of social
welfare attainable over the long-run. The intuition follows from a key feature of dynamic
nonlinear income taxation without commitment. In the absence of a participation con-
straint, high-skill individuals know that if they reveal their type in period 1, they will be
subjected to rst-best redistributive taxation in period 2. Therefore, high-skill individ-
uals must be o¤ered an attractive tax treatment in period 1 if they are to be willing to
reveal their type, to compensate them for the unattractive tax treatment they will face in
period 2. This restricts the governments ability to redistribute and raise social welfare
in period 1. Now consider the e¤ects of the participation constraint. The participation
constraint means that high-skill individuals obtain more utility in period 2, because they
will emigrate unless they receive at least their reservation utility. Therefore, high-skill
individuals now have less incentive to conceal their type in period 1. Accordingly, the
government can now o¤er high-skill individuals a less attractive tax treatment in period
1 and still obtain skill-type information. Taken together, this implies that social welfare
is lower in period 2 (due to the participation constraint), but higher in period 1 (as the
incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed). Moreover, social welfare summed over the
skill individuals always receive di¤erent tax treatments. The e¤ects of pooling taxation are discussed
further in Section 4.
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two periods remains unchanged, because optimal taxation balances the short-run ben-
ets vis-a-vis relaxation of the incentive-compatibility constraint against the long-run
costs of the participation constraint.
3.1 A Numerical Example
As our proposition assumes that bU2H > VH , in this subsection we provide a numerical
example of our result. We also explain why our assumption, and hence our result, will
be valid unless VH is so high as to undo a key feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation
without commitment.
In the numerical example we assume that the utility function takes the form ln(cti) 
lti. This is based on Chetty (2006), who concludes that a reasonable estimate of the
coe¢cient of relative risk aversion is one (log utility). The OECD (2014) reports that
approximately one-third of adults have attained tertiary level education. We assume
that these individuals are high-skill and the remainder are low-skill, i.e., we set  = 1=3.
Fang (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2007) estimate that the college wage premium is
approximately 60%. We therefore normalise the low-skill types wage rate to unity
(wL = 1), and set the high-skill types wage rate at wH = 1:6. Following common
practice, we assume an annual discount rate of 4%. However, as most individuals work
for around 40 years of their lives, we take each period to be 20 years in length. An
annual discount rate of 4% then implies a 20-year discount factor of  = 0:456. The
table reports the parameter values used in the numerical example, as well as the results
for the cases of VH =  1:0 and VH =  0:9.
TABLE ABOUT HERE
It can be seen that as the value of the participation constraint is increased from
VH =  1:0 to VH =  0:9, the discounted sum of social welfare over the two periods
remains unchanged (at  1:208). Social welfare increases in period 1 and decreases
in period 2. These ndings are an example of our proposition, since the assumption
bU2H > VH is satised for the parameters chosen.
For the case of VH =  1:0, it can be seen that the utility a high-skill individual
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obtains in period 1 ( 0:432 by choosing hc1H ; y
1
Hi) is greater than what they could obtain
by mimicking ( 0:710 by choosing hc1L; y
1
Li). Likewise, for VH =  0:9, the utility a high-
skill individual obtains in period 1 ( 0:478 by choosing hc1H ; y
1
Hi) is greater than what
they could obtain by mimicking ( 0:687 by choosing hc1L; y
1
Li). As discussed earlier, a key
feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation without commitment is that high-skill individuals
know that they will be subjected to rst-best taxation in period 2 if they reveal their
type in period 1. Accordingly, high-skill individuals must be o¤ered an attractive tax
treatment in period 1 to reveal their type, as compensation for the unattractive tax
treatment they will receive in period 2. Therefore, compared to static settings, hc1H ; y
1
Hi
will be favourable and hc1L; y
1




















would hold in static settings. It is only if VH was so high as to undo this
general feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation without commitment that our assumption
would no longer be valid.
3.2 A General Condition
In this subsection, we provide a general condition under which bU2H > VH , assuming log
utility. It is shown in the appendix that:






+  [ln(wH)  1] > VH (3.1)
For any particular value of the participation constraint, equation (3.1) can be used to
check if bU2H > VH . For example, one can check that (3.1) is satised for the parameters
used in our numerical example.
4 Discussion and Some Caveats
Our proposition is driven by an important feature of dynamic nonlinear income taxation
without commitment, namely, that high-skill individuals must be o¤ered an attractive
tax treatment in period 1 to reveal their type. This restricts redistribution in period
1 and reduces social welfare. In fact, it is possible that the welfare cost is su¢ciently
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severe that it would be better if the government did not induce skill-type revelation.
That is, it may be optimal for the government to implement pooling taxation. This
involves the government o¤ering a single tax treatment to all individuals, and therefore
skill-type information is not revealed.
Our analysis implicitly assumes that pooling taxation is not optimal. If pooling
taxation is optimal, our result no longer holds. However, the question arises as to how
likely it is that pooling becomes optimal. Pooling taxation is quite severe in that it
imposes the same tax treatment on everyone. Guo and Krause (2015b) show, for a
range of empirically-plausible parameter values, that pooling taxation is not optimal in
either two-period or innite-horizon settings. Indeed, they show that even the autarkic
equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare than does pooling taxation. Therefore,
while it is possible that pooling taxation is optimal, it is less likely than regular separating
taxation (under which our result holds).
Perhaps a more serious caveat follows from our assumption that the participation
constraint appears only in period 2. If one assumes that high-skill individuals are immo-
bile in the short-run and mobile in the long-run, then our assumption seems reasonable.
However, if a participation constraint for high-skill individuals was introduced into pe-
riod 1, and it rendered the incentive-compatibility constraint slack, then our result would
no longer hold. For this to occur, the value of the rst-period participation constraint
would have to be quite high, since incentive-compatibility requires that high-skill individ-
uals be o¤ered a generous rst-period tax treatment (as discussed earlier). Nevertheless,
it is worth noting that our result would not hold in that case. It is also worth noting that
for su¢ciently high values of the participation constraint, it might be better to simply
let high-skill individuals emigrate. But we do not consider that possibility here.
Finally, nonlinear income taxation a la Mirrlees (1971) can be viewed as an appli-
cation of principal-agent theory, so one may wonder if an analogue of our result would
apply in other applications of principal-agent theory in dynamic settings. For example,
repeated contracting vis-a-vis insurance, regulation, or employment agreements.4 An
4La¤ont and Martimort (2002) provide a textbook treatment of principal-agent theory and its
applications.
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important di¤erence is that in nonlinear income taxation, the principal (the govern-
ment) seeks to maximise the aggregate welfare of the agents (the individuals), rather
than having its own separate objective. That said, in all dynamic applications without
commitment, the agent-type with the information advantage must be compensated to
give-up that advantage. So it seems possible that an analogue of our result may apply
in these other applications as well.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown, using a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model without
commitment, that the threat of high-skill emigration can increase social welfare in the
short-run and have no e¤ect on social welfare over the long-run. While this result may be
viewed as being primarily of theoretical interest, it also provides a new example of how
restrictions on policy instruments that are clearly welfare-reducing when the government
can commit, may in fact be benecial when the government cannot commit.
6 Appendix
Proof of the Proposition
The Lagrangian corresponding to programme (2:1)  (2:3) is:


































where 2 > 0 and 2H > 0 are Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions are:
(1  )u0(c2L)  




+ 2(1  ) = 0 (A.3)
u0(c2H)  
2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where the last equality follows from (A.3) and (A.5). This shows that @W 2()=@VH < 0.

































































































where the last equality makes use of (A.2) and (A.3).




















































where use has been made of (A.10) and (A.11). This shows that @W 1()=@VH > 0.
Finally, equations (A.8) and (A.17) imply that @W 1()=@VH + @W
2()=@VH = 0. 
Derivation of Equation (3.1)
Assuming log utility, equations (A.2)  (A.7) can be solved to yield:
c2L = wL and y
2
L = wL  
wH
(1  )
[ln(wH)  1  VH ] (A.18)




. Using (A.18) and after some algebraic manipulation, it
can be shown that:






+  [ln(wH)  1] > VH (A.19)
which is equation (3.1). 
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u c l c l  
Parameter values:
                     φ 0.333 Lw 1.000
                    δ 0.456 Hw 1.600
1.0
H
V   0.9
H
V  
Low-skill utility: period 1 –1.082 –1.046
High-skill utility: period 1 –0.432 –0.478
Mimicker utility: period 1 –0.710 –0.687
Low-skill utility: period 2 –0.624 –0.704




U : period 2 –0.390 –0.444
Social welfare: period 1 –0.866 –0.856
Social welfare: period 2 –0.749 –0.769
Social welfare: total –1.208 –1.208
